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Abstract. Medical and general health-related measurements can in-
creasingly be performed via IoT components and protocols, whilst in-
expensive sensors allow the capturing of a wider range of parameters
in clinical, care, and general health monitoring domains. Measurements
must typically be combined to allow e.g. differential diagnosis, and in
many cases it is highly desirable to track progression over time or to
detect anomalies in care and general monitoring contexts. However, the
sensitive nature of such data requires safeguarding, particularly where
data is retained by different third parties such as medical device manu-
facturers for extended periods. This appears to be very challenging espe-
cially when standards-based interoperability (i.e using IoT standards like
HyperCAT or Web of Things-WoT) is to be achieved. This is because
open meta-data of those standards can facilitate inference and source
linkage if compiled or analysed by adversaries. Therefore, we propose an
architecture of pseudonimyised distributed storage including a dynamic
query analyser to protect the privacy of information being released.
Keywords: medical IoT, differential privacy, pseudonymisation, meta-
data, anonymisation
1 Introduction
Privacy has been identified as a major concern in the Internet of Things (IoT)
[27], but earlier it was mostly concentrated on such aspects as identification of
individuals and interactions, localisation and tracking, without paying much at-
tention to the profiling of individuals and their behaviour based on data sources
ranging from radio-frequency identification (RFID) tags via surveillance devices
to wearable components. Nevertheless, there are few attempts to address this
particular issue in IoT like in RFC-7744 [24]. However, despite the IoT potential
for improved outcomes as well as cost savings identified in various domains in-
cluding the health sector [7], individuals are subject to monitoring by diverse sen-
sors over extendable time-periods, resulting in linkage of such different sources
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as a major risk for re-identification [10]. Measurements and observations not
only limited to IoT environments may be linked together eventually as individ-
ual data sources become interchangeable and are no longer restricted to vertical
application domains in which anonymisation can take place as required.
Current practice frequently relies on information being de-identified in a par-
ticular context, but without considering how such information may be linked
with other sources or over longer time-periods as may become feasible for health
monitoring and care where symptoms may be analysed algorithmically or are de-
sirable for research purposes. It is, however, well known that merely anonymising
a pre-defined subset of attributes will not prevent re-identification when com-
bined with other attributes [17]. This, however, has severe implications for how
such information arising in a medical context may be processed, stored, and pre-
sented. In the United Kingdom, common law and a number of laws including the
UK Data Protection Act (1998), the NHS Act (2006), Social Care Act (2012),
Human Rights Act (1998), and Data Protection (Processing of Sensitive Per-
sonal Data) Order (2000) impose bounds on handling of sensitive information,
whilst EU General Data Protection Regulation (2016/679) coming into effect in
2018 imposes further constraints. Also, similar (less prescriptive) considerations
apply in other jurisdictions where e.g. the U.S. Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) Privacy Rule defines health information as indi-
vidually identifiable if (1) it identifies the individual; or (2) there is a reasonable
basis to believe the information can be used to identify the individual.
In order to allow the flexible effective aggregation of diverse IoT data sets and
measurements in a privacy-preserving and lawful manner, it is insufficient just to
aggregate even de-identified sources, but rather must provide further control over
processing and queries, particularly where data sources may be aggregated over
time or new sources added. In this work, we specifically address the impact of
involving external sources (prior knowledge) on the control of privacy protection
via using e.g. a meta-data element in medical IoT (referring to HyperCAT [4]
and W3C Web of Things-WoT [2] standards) which is typically used for de-
scribing IoT asset and attributes semantics for interoperability and discovery
purposes. For this reason, we propose an architecture of pseudonimyised dis-
tributed storage incorporating dynamic query-based privacy protection relying
on differential privacy models to ensure that constraints are honoured.
Sec.2 reviews related work. Sec.3 describes meta-data potentials in privacy.
Sec.4 addresses the proposed distributed storage model for protecting privacy.
Sec.5 analyses the problem of aggregation and proposes a query-based approach
for selective release. Conclusions and future work are in Sec.6.
2 Background
Emerging of various IoT-based and mobile health applications has offered an
open and seamless way of tracking health of population such as HealthKit [1],
Medical IoT monitoring [26,20,21,23], etc. However, using such complex sys-
tems poses more privacy concerns about how the sensitive information is being
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handled. Also, most IoT-related security works are focusing on securing commu-
nication rather than data at rest. Therefore, it is very demanding to expand the
vision of how to effectively protect privacy of data in this system.
In order to protect the privacy of data records, some transformations need
to be applied. They may involve reversible operations (such as encryption and
pseudonymisation) and irreversible ones (anonymisation, deleting, obscuring the
data [5]). According to [19,18], pseudonymisation is developed as an alternative
for encryption as a privacy-enhancing technique in which identification data must
be replaced with cryptographically generated pseudonyms to keep some form of
secret association with original data. In this particular approach, original data or
measurements are presumed to be held separately and securely from processed
data. However, this technique appears to be insufficient alone for maintaining the
privacy, because an attacker can make a data analysis of the open measurements
when data from different IoT devices for the same patients are collected together.
As presented in [5], there are different types of obscuring anonymising strate-
gies. They include: replacing data with synthetic one [8], data swapping [6], im-
putation of gaps [22] or noise [9], rounding, binning and suppression [12,13]. In
our context, rounding (binning) is considered as a simple and ’fair’ deterministic
approach of data generalisation (i.e. refer to numerical discrete and continuous
data type) that does not require imputing any wrong information into the data,
such as artificial noise. These strategies have to be measured with some quan-
titative criterion to ensure that the privacy defence is kept at some satisfactory
level. Two the most well-known criteria are k-anonimity [25] and differential pri-
vacy [9]. An example of privacy defence for time series MIoT data is shown in [16]
based on differential privacy framework. In this certain work, data are collected
from one sensor and the goal is to prevent identifying the small time changes
by the attacker. In addition, we need to involve the prior knowledge about fea-
ture dependence into differential privacy as some different sensor measurements
may be correlated. Necessity to modify the differential privacy approach [9] for
dependent features is stated and partially addressed in [14].
On the other side, the meta-data aspect becomes very critical since the meta-
data may possibly contain some information which can be linked to an individual
or group resulting in privacy violation. Madaan et al. [15] discuss the impact of
meta-data on the privacy goals. This work demonstrates the potential role of
meta-data which can play in constructing prior information threatening privacy,
and how to mitigate this risk by adopting a differential privacy framework.
3 Meta-Data
For interoperability and integration purposes, most well known IoT standards
incorporate meta-data to describe IoT devices and its interactions, for example,
HyperCAT [4] and Web of Thing (WoT) - Thing Description (TD) [2]. Meta-
data involved in the medical IoT system without mindful consideration appears
to be intuitively harmless to data privacy. However, nowadays because of new
technological innovations, meta-data can be easily compiled and analysed, lead-
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ing to disclosure of sensitive information: device attributes, patient location, etc.
Analysed meta-data of a given medical IoT system enables adversaries to estab-
lish a comprehensive profile of a patient’s location, medical conditions, medical
devices in use, etc. Also, some meta-data may contain some explicit and implicit
potentials (e.g. some semantics) in drawing a picture about patients patterns of
behaviour, interactions, and associations, exposing even more about that patient
than the content of his\her medical conditions. Therefore, meta-data becomes
a significant source of knowledge which can be encoded and exploited by ad-
versaries to threaten privacy and this element needs to be taken into account
seriously when tackling privacy issues in the medical IoT system.
Fig. 1. Meta-data capabilities on privacy
To realise the significance of meta-data privacy leakage, we rely in this work
on two well-known IoT standards, HyperCAT [4] and W3C Web of Things (WoT)
[2]. The HyperCAT standard introduces an extensible, lightweight JSON-based
catalogue which facilitates description and discovery of IoT resources over the
Web using REST APIs, meta-data, semantic annotations, and special URI con-
ventions. This standard is proposed in order to enable distributed data sources
(i.e. hubs) to be utilised collaboratively by applications in a uniform machine-
readable format. While, Web of Things presents a versatile IoT standard refining
the Internet of Things by integrating smart things not only into the Internet
(the network) but into the Web (the application layer). This standard leverages
platform-independent APIs for web developers and offers a means for different
platforms to discover and inter-operate with each other. This depends on rich
JSON-based meta-data, Thing Description (TD), to define the data and interac-
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tion models for applications, and the communications and security requirements
for platforms to communicate seamlessly. Also, it is important to address that
Web of Things is still in the early stage of fully incorporating semantics of things
and the domain constraints associated with this semantics, seeking for building
W3C’s extensible RDF and Linked Data. Therefore, we propose an exhaustive
set of related-measurement and device information which can be extracted from
accessible meta-data and may be linked, causing a privacy risk to a given pa-
tient as shown in Fig. 1. To perceive meta-data capabilities, we use meta-data
from HyperCAT or W3C Web of Things (WoT) as an illustrative example to
support our claims. we identify four main properties: (1) device attributes, (2)
measurement attributes, (3) measurement correlation / mutual information and
(4) semantics matching from others sources.
Fig. 2. Two simple meta-data samples for (A) TD-WoT and (B) HyperCAT
Measurement attributes: It is noticeable that meta-data used in IoT con-
text seems to enclose some useful information about attributes of individual
measurement such as measurement prior distribution, ranges, precision (error
rate) and correlation. However, these extracted attributes can be exploited and
linked by adversaries resulting in a privacy violation of a patient associated with
these measurement attributes. For example, learning about a range and proba-
bility density function of an individual measurement from meta-data along with
incorporating a sample of measurement data reveals sensitive information about
a patient medical status. Some types of measurements have the capability to
show dependence which can be linked to the individual, for example, opening
door, motion, etc. Fig. 2 presents two simple examples of meta-data representa-
tions of thermometer sensor using Web of Things and HyperCAT.
Device attributes: Meta-data may include device attributes which are
unassociated with the measurement being generated, but likely to leak some
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sensitive information about the patient (e.g. location, portability, etc). Some at-
tributes of a device like being wearable or using some communication medium
and protocols (e.g. BLE, Zigbee, etc.) may indicate to the patient localisation.
Measurement Correlation / Mutual Information on Aggregation:
In some cases in the system, measurements of different medical devices or sensors
are usually aggregated or grouped in a gateway before sending them to the back-
end storage. Knowing about this aggregation and some features of associated
devices from meta-data, some information sensitive can be easily obtained or
inferred (i.e. patient location, health condition). Also, some information about a
possible influence of the physiological measurements on each other (e.g. having a
certain blood pressure and heartbeat measurements can be connected with heart
problems) can be a threat to the privacy see Sec. 5. For example, the W3C WoT
standard, unlike the HyperCat standard, offers a structured and visible meta-
data (i.e. TD of Gateway Servient) indicating where and how data is combined.
Therefore, this particular information along with some extra information about
some device attributes (e.g. TD for Bluetooth devices communicating to the same
gateway) may reveal sensitive location properties. Being aware of aggregation
of some certain types of medical measurements (e.g. ECG, body pressure, GPS,
motion, etc.) may often expose some medical status or health problem.
Semantics Matching from others sources: most meta-data models are
typically enriched with semantics (using common vocabularies) for more machine
and human readability and involve some semantic annotations for facilitating re-
source discovery and knowledge reasoning. This information of semantics may
enable adversaries to find and learn a lot of extra related-measurement and -
device information either manually or automatically and this particular prior
knowledge can be exploited to breach privacy. However, the current HyperCAT
and Web of Things standards only rely on statics approaches incorporating the
semantics by using semantics annotation for some properties in the meta-data
(e.g. using JSON-LD in Web of Things whereas using RDF-based Uniform Re-
source Identifiers (URIs) which typically identify data sources in HyperCAT).
For example, some particular semantic queries for the meta-data in these stan-
dards can be requested in order to discover more details about medical devices
in the system including related measurement attributes and constraints.
4 Pseudonymisation
The diverse and pervasive nature of the measurement data in a medical IoT sys-
tem incites several privacy threats (e.g. identification and attribute disclosures
including information linking [27,11]) as a result of subject (i.e. patients and
devices) asset association, intermediate data aggregation and system meta-data
being incorporated. Also, for the purpose of system control and data utilisation,
individual measurements in this particular system unlike a typical health systems
demonstrate a strong link with the device and patient information (e.g. patient
and device records IDs) whether directly or indirectly as most IoT devices and
sensors is normally bound to a certain patient or vicinity. Therefore, pseudonymi-
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Fig. 3. The proposed distributed architecture: a pseudonymising system
sation offers a distinct approach to preserve privacy by anonymising data with
the advantage of reversing this anonymisation if required. Pseudonymisation is
a technique where all data identifiers should be changed by one or more artificial
identifiers or pseudonyms [11]. Various approaches for patient pseudonymisation
are proposed as shown in [3]. In this work, we adopt the simple approach of
substituting real indentifiers with pseudorandom identifiers as some particular
approaches in [3] appear to suffer from performance and management overheads
because of heavily using crypto methods and intricate interactions. We propose
a model of pseudonymised distributed storage offering an effective means to pro-
tect measurement privacy with keeping utility of measurement data competently,
in medical IoT systems as shown in Fig. 3. This model mainly assumes there are
multiple measurement providers (e.g. Third-party or IoT vendors) which typi-
cally store medical or health-related measurements collected from IoT sensors
or gateways. Each measurement provider should keep measurements along with
their own associated IoT devices’ and patients’ information in a pseudonymised
form via using the pseudonymisation service provided by a resolution storage
centre. In addition, all providers are assumed to share different pseudo-random
identifiers with the resolution centre not the original identifiers associated with
their patients for protection purposes in case a resolution centre is compromised.
In other words, each provider must have a a table for mapping between its real
IDs and their random IDs generated for sharing with the centre. The resolu-
tion centre has twofold roles. The first one is to generate and store random
pseudonyms for the different identifiers (i.e patient, device and measurement
IDs) whereas the second role is to control and resolve analyst queries with pre-
serving privacy. The resolution centre relies on a set of master tables for map-
ping between different generated pseudonyms with their corresponding provider
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identifiers. Important to stress that adopting this specific pseudonymisation ap-
proach is to impede any privacy breaches coming from device and patient levels.
On the other side, the de-pseudonymised service in the resolution centre as a
second level of privacy protection involves a query analyser to anonymise re-
sults of a query sufficiently before posting to the data analyst. Also, the query
analyser is used to restrict some queries if releasing those queries may lead to
re-identification by exploiting some prior knowledge extracted from meta-data
and query history, the details will be discussed in the next section.
Finally, we argue that our distributed storage model with providing purely
randomised (not derived) pseudonyms for patient, device and measurement iden-
tifiers does not guarantee unlinkability, but it makes the process of linking a
pseudonym to an individual very cumbersome and demand a lot of effort and
resources. In our architecture, the resolution data centre is only a map between
different measurement data repositories and patient and device repositories, so
any compromise which may occur to the resolution centre or other repositories,
will arguably not compromise the whole system. In other words, the key privacy
advantage of a distributed system is avoiding a central point of data aggrega-
tion. Important to mention that the proposed architecture is assumed to have a
standard access control managing access of front-end and back-end parties (e.g.
RBAC) and also establish a secure communication between different endpoints.
5 Differentially Private Query De-Pseudonymisation
Even if the data records are pseudonymised, there is still a chance for adver-
saries to identify a patient from data analysis, i.e. analysis of the measurements
generated by different sensors for a certain patient (see DB Schema diagram at
Fig.3) collected at the resolution centre storage.
According to the scheme of data processing, we assume that the Measurement
Storage (see Fig.3) collects together only the records and strictly pseudonymised
references to patients. They should not include any other information related to
the patients such as their meta-data or history of illness.
We also expect some input in the form of queries from a user (i.e. data ana-
lyst). The system contains a query analyser block (Differential Privacy analyser)
which uses prior knowledge for decisions.
We assume that the data record is collected for a patient in the form of
(t1, s1, d1), . . . , (tm, sm, dm) where ti is a time stamp, si is a reference to a sensor,
di is the numerical value of a measurement.
The prior knowledge of the data comes from knowledge resources such as
meta-data (obtained by HyperCat and Web Of Things), and domain-specific
expertise. We assume that it comes in the form of restrictions on possible joint
distribution of the observations coming from different sensors.
5.1 Privacy Constraint
The principal way of keeping the privacy is an anomymising strategy A trans-
forming the original measurement sequence to a form observable to the user. We
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prefer this strategy to be deterministic, but assume it applied to the measure-
ment values only, while the schedule is open.
We consider the following version of differential privacy constraint for de-
terministic strategies, under prior knowledge. Let D ∈ Rm mean an individual
data record, A be a strategy, P be the set of possible joint probability density
functions P on Rm. The (ε,P)-differential privacy constraint for A is
∀P ∈ P : ProbP {A(D) = A(D′)} =
∫
D∈Rms.t.A(D)=A(D′)
P (dD) ≥ e−ε
where P generates m-dimensional data records D and D′ independently of each
other, P is the class of possible density functions on Rm according to the prior
knowledge and the parameter ε (known as a privacy budget) quantifies strength
of the constraint. This requirement means that the data record produced for a
patient should be with high probability indistinguishable from another record
generated for another patient with same (or similar) schedule of measurements.
The useful property of (ε,P)-differential privacy constraint is its decompos-
ability, related to sharing the privacy budget over the queries. Assume that
q ≤ m is the overall number of queries, k1, . . . , kq are the number of measure-
ments addressed by the queries and
0 = ε0 ≤ ε1 ≤ · · · ≤ εk−1 ≤ εk ≤ · · · ≤ εq ≤ ε
where εk is a measure of the volume of information available for disclosure after
first k queries. A way to satisfy the privacy constraint is dividing it into steps:
ProbP {A(dq1 , . . . , dqk) = A(d′q1 , . . . , d′qk)
|A(dq1 , . . . , dqk−1) = A(d′q1 , . . . , d′qk−1)} ≥ e−(εk−εk−1).
5.2 Scheme of Differential Privacy Analyser
The central system has to include Differential Privacy analyser block for the
queries in its Resolution Centre (see Fig.3). We assume that this block contains
the prior information available for the work. In order to give a safe answer to
the next query, it stores the history of preceding queries (Fig.4).
We introduce a anonymisation strategy of sequential binning (rounding) for
the measurements in this architecture as most data are numerical:
Ak : D = (dq1 , . . . , dqk)→ (b1, . . . , bk) = B
where bj =
[
dqj
rj
]
× rj . Here square brackets mean eplacing a number with the
closest integer. The values rj is the resolution level (precision) for the j-th query.
Calculation of the resolution coefficients is linked to the order of queries: rk is
a function of the previously observed feature values (dq1 , . . . , dqk) but not of the
later ones. We can also assume that, up to fixed prior knowledge, rj is a function
of b1, . . . , bk−1 and dqk only, as shown by the arrows on the Fig.4. This way of
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Fig. 4. Differential Privacy analyser for De-pseudonymisation service.
binning means that classes of indistinguishable records are represented in the
vector space of possible records as multi-dimensional parallelepipeds (’bricks’)
of possibly different sizes.
The exact way of calculation depends on the form of the prior knowledge P.
In the sequential setting done above, the estimation of ri becomes a relatively
easy task for empirical estimation in the most typical cases. Especially, if P
consists of only one or several distributions P one can make simulation of the
conditional distribution of dqk given b1, . . . , bk−1, and decrease ri as far as the
conditional privacy constraint is not empirically broken for any P . If P is a
parametric distribution with some range of parameters, then it can be reasonably
approximated by scanning over a grid within the allowed parameter range. We
recommend users to give a desirable resolution level rˆi which is sufficient, so that
attempts for further decreasing ri can be stopped when ri = rˆi is reached.
It is also required to select a strategy of sharing privacy budgets. Possible
examples may be as follows. Equal share: for an initially fixed positive number
q, min{ε/q, εr} is considered as upper bound for (εk − εk−1), that is either spent
totally at a step, or decreased if the reachable rˆk is smaller than rk required
by the user. Share in geometric progression: for an initially fixed h < 1, hεr is
considered as upper bound for (εk − εk−1); all the rest is done the same way as
above. Those strategies can be modified in various ways, e.g. higher weights may
be given to more important sensors.
6 Conclusions
We propose a prototypical privacy architecture integrating both pseudonymi-
sation and anonymisation techniques in a Medical IoT system for a sake of
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protecting data privacy and maximising utility. A distributed pseudonymisated
storage using pseudo-random identifier generators is developed to suite the dis-
tributed MIoT system as different sensors or IoT devices may be provided by
different MIoT providers. On the other side, apparently, medical IoT meta-data
like HyperCAT, Web of Things, etc. may become a key enabler to directly or
indirectly infer about patient measurements leading to more privacy breaches in
such a system. Therefore, we design a query analyser to perform the anonymi-
sation stage and this particular analyser with considering prior knowledge (from
meta-data, domain experts, measurement dependence, etc.) must control releas-
ing queries requested by data analysts. In addition, the query analyser may use
a quantitative method of disclosing information in reply to the queries, based on
a limited privacy budget for a differential privacy model.
One direction of the future work is to tackle different types of measurements,
for example, textual or categorical. The differential privacy model can be de-
veloped further e.g. addressing the leakage of information through the schedule.
The may involve elements of inter-feature binning suggested in [16].
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